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INTRODUCTION

Seizing expressive material which has not been adjudicated obscene,' as a penalty for committing a crime, can be characterized
either as an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech or as a
1. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). A court must first determine that the material is obscene before the obscene material may be prohibited.
Id. at 23. In Miller, the Supreme Court set forth the test for obscenity. The trier of
fact must decide the following:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest,
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.

(115)
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valid subsequent punishment. Although obscene material can be
seized or banned without violating the First Amendment, 2 the government generally cannot seize nonobscene, expressive material
without violating the Constitution.3 The Supreme Court has consistently held that preventing speech before it is made, such as by
confiscating expressive material, is a prior restraint and as such
faces a strong presumption of unconstitutionality. 4 Courts may take
a different view when the speech is prevented by the operation of
criminal penalties. 5
When a criminal statute authorizes penalties following conviction of a crime, courts generally view it as a valid punishment. 6 The
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 7 authorizes the seizure of assets after conviction of a predicate or qualifying crime that involves racketeering.8 Seizure occurs without
regard to the expressive nature of the seized assets. 9 Thus the outcome of the characterization of the RICO provisions requiring forfeiture of assets has a significant effect on free speech and the use
of forfeiture as a criminal penalty.' 0 If courts characterize the provisions as a subsequent punishment, the First Amendment may not
be used to protect expressive material from censorship." If courts
instead characterize the provisions as a prior restraint on speech,

Id. at 24 (citation omitted). If the trier of fact finds that the material is obscene,
the material may be regulated or proscribed. Id.
2. The First Amendment to the Constitution provides: "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The First Amendment protects the publication as well as the distribution of expressive material. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64-65 n.6
(1963).
3. See Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 65 (quoting Marcus v. Search Warrant of 104
E. Tenth St., 367 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1961)). Generally, government may not prohibit expressive material until it is adjudicated obscene. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
4. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Bantam Books, 372
U.S. at 70.
5. See Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993); Fort Wayne Books,
Inc. v. Indiana, 489-U.S. 46, 62 (1989).
6. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2773.
7. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1988).
8. Id. § 1963. For a definition of predicate offense, see infra note 41.
9. RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1963; see Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770 (stating RICO
seizes assets blindly).
10. See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770.
11. Id. at 2773.
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the government will not be able to use forfeiture to seize expressive
12
material.
In Alexander v. United States,13 the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether the federal government's right to punish illegal
conduct infringes upon the First Amendment's protection of free
speech when the postconviction punishment includes the forfeiture
of nonobscene material. 14 In Alexander, federal authorities used the
RICO forfeiture provisions to seize business property and approximately nine million dollars in assets from a businessperson who was
convicted of federal obscenity and RICO offenses. 15 The forfeited
assets included expressive material that had not been adjudicated
obscene. 16 The Supreme Court held by a 5-4 majority that the
seizure of nonobscene material authorized by the RICO forfeiture
provisions was constitutional. 17 The Alexander majority determined
that the forfeiture of this material was a subsequent punishment
and as such was a legitimate criminal penalty that did not implicate
the First Amendment.' 8
The dissent in Alexander countered that the seizure of expressive material was an unconstitutional prior restraint that had a severe chilling effect on speech and expression.' 9 The dissent
asserted that dealers of expressive material will stop selling and
renting material that is pornographic, but does not violate current
12. Id. at 2784-85 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (viewing RICO forfeiture provisions as government censorship).

13. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
14. Id. at 2770-71.
15. Id. at 2770.
16. Id. at 2769. The expressive material included magazines, films and videotapes. Id. Additionally, business equipment such as film projectors, television
monitors, cash registers and business vehicles was taken. Brief for Petitioner at 10,
Alexander, 113 S. CL at 2766.
17. Alexander, 113 S. CL at 2774.
18. Id. at 2770; see also Ana Maria Marin, Comment, RICO's Forfeiture Provision:
A FirstAmendment Restraint on Adult Bookstores, 43 U. MAMIi L. REv. 419, 440 (1988).
The Court held that "[the decisions] establish quite clearly that the First Amendment does not prohibit either stringent criminal sanctions for obscenity offenses
or forfeiture of expressive materials as punishment for criminal conduct." Alexander,
113 S. Ct. at 2773 (emphasis added). Punishment for violating the obscenity statutes may include limitations on the prospective sale of nonobscene material. I at
2770.
19. See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2776 (KennedyJ, dissenting). Justice Kennedy
emphatically stated: "This ominous, onerous threat undermines free speech and
press principles essential to our personal freedom." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
see Tod R. Eggenberger, Comment, RICO vs. Dealers in Obscene Matter: The First
Amendment Battle, 22 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 71, 94-95 (1988); Marin, supra note
18, at 441-46 (predicting effect RICO forfeiture provisions would have on free
speech).
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obscenity laws. 20 The dissent believed that dealers will engage in
self-censorship because the government can close entire businesses
merely by proving to a court that dealers engaged in a "pattern of
21
racketeering activity."
This Note will first set forth the legal background to the issue
in Alexander, including the development of RICO and the competing constitutional theories underlying the forfeiture issue: subsequent punishment and prior restraint. This Note will examine the
Court's analysis of the RICO forfeiture provisions as a subsequent
punishment for past criminal conduct. This Note will then critically examine the Court's definition and analysis of the prior restraint doctrine and the Court's assertion that forfeiture under
RICO does not constitute a prior restraint. This Note reviews the
dissent's characterization of the RICO provisions as a prior restraint
on free speech and concludes that this is the better view of the provisions. Finally, this Note will discuss the effect Alexander is likely to
have on free speech.
II.

BACKGROUND

The main issue in Alexander was the constitutionality of RICO's

forfeiture provisions when they were used to seize expressive material.2 2 This Section will first examine the development of and

amendments to RICO, specifically focusing on the addition of
stricter forfeiture penalties and the predicate offense of obscenity.
This Section will then analyze the procedural requirements for the
seizure of expressive material. This Section will conclude with an
examination of the constitutional theories of prior restraint and
subsequent punishment.

A.

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

In 1970, Congress passed RICO to eliminate organized crime
in the United States by prohibiting conduct typically used by crimi20. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2784 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see Eggenberger,
supra note 19, at 95.
21. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2784 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); RICO, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5) (1988); see RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (defining
forfeiture provisions). To prove a "pattern of racketeering activity" the government must prove the commission of two racketeering acts occurring after 1970 but
within ten years of each other. RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The government must
also show that "the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or
pose a threat of continued criminal activity." H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (emphasis in original) (stating acts must be related
and part of pattern of continuous criminal conduct).
22. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769.
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nal organizations. 23 To accomplish this goal, Congress included
forfeiture penalties in RICO
as punishment for conviction of a
24
RICO predicate offense.
Congress intended the penalties to cripple the economic structure of criminal organizations. 25 To weaken organized crime's financial viability, RICO prohibits the use of income gained from a
racketeering activity for the benefit of a business.2 6 RICO also prohibits the acquisition or operation of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.2 7 Congress created these provisions to
prevent criminal organizations from using racketeering tactics to
28
expand and strengthen their economic power.
Congress enacted RICO after conducting hearings on the
problem of organized crime in the United States. 29 Congress cited
the detrimental impact of organized crime on the nation's economy and the increasing corruption of legitimate businesses as factors that led to RICO's passage.30 Testimony at the congressional
hearings established that criminal organizations gained power by
conducting illegal activities such as gambling, loan sharking, theft
and fencing of property, dealing in drugs and "other forms of social
23. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Statement of
Findings and Purpose, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat. 922) 1073; see also Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983) (stating RICO was "intended to provide new
weapons of unprecedented scope for assault upon organized crime and its economic roots").
24. RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Criminals convicted of
RICO predicate offenses forfeited all assets which were derived from the illegal
activities or maintained by the illegal activities. ML § 1963(a) (1)-(3).
25. Id. § 1961 (Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose).
26. Id. § 1962(a). Under § 1962(a), it is unlawful for:
any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly,
from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal.., to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of
such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
Id. RICO only applies when the business is engaged in interstate commerce. Id.
§ 1962(a)-(c). However, many states have enacted statutes similar to RICO that
prohibit similar types of activity which are not in interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (West 1986). The Constitution's Commerce Clause
provides that "Congress shall have the power... to regulate commerce.., among
the several states." U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
27. RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b).
28. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Statement of
Findings and Purpose, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat. 922) 1073.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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exploitation."3 1 Thus Congress acted to attack the economic roots
of organized crime by supplementing existing criminal statutes with

RICO.32 Congress passed RICO to create an effective tool to com-

bat organized crime.3 3 In its early years, however, RICO was not as
successful as Congress had intended, leading to congressional
amendment of RICO in 1984.
1.

1984 Amendments to RICO - The Comprehensive ForfeitureAct of
1984 - ForfeitureProvisions

RICO's ineffectiveness was due in part to court decisions that
limited the scope of RICO's forfeiture provisions and to
prosecutorial failure to consistently seek the forfeiture penalties. 34
To remedy these inadequacies in RICO,3 5 Congress enacted the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act (CFA) as Chapter III of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.36 The CFA amended RICO by
adding stricter forfeiture provisions as punishment for conviction

31. Id. Selling obscene material was not included or described in the original
act as one of the major activities of criminal organizations.
32. See id.
33. Id. Congress set forth its intent when it enacted RICO:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in
the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime.
Id.
34. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3374, 3375, 3377 (citing United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276
(7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir.
1980)); see Craig W. Palm, RICO Forfeitureand the Eighth Amendment: When Is Everything Too Much?, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 2 n.5 (1991).
35. S.REP. No. 225, supra note 34, at 191-92, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3374-75. RICO's inadequacies were detailed in the Senate Report. The Senate
Report reviewed a General Accounting Office (GAO) Report which concluded
that the federal government was not as successful in implementing the forfeiture
provisions as Congress intended. Id. The GAO Report listed two reasons for this
failure: "(1) that Federal law enforcement agencies had not aggressively pursued
forfeiture, and (2) that the current forfeiture statutes contain numerous limitations and ambiguities that have significantly impeded the full realization of forfeiture's potential as a powerful law enforcement weapon." Id. at 3374. The CFA
amendments were intended to improve procedures to ensure forfeiture. See id. at
3375-76.
36. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 (CFA), Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 301323, 98 Stat. 1837, 2140-57 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 19, 21, 26
and 28 U.S.C.). Sections 301 and 302 amended the RICO forfeiture provisions
found in 18 U.S.C. § 1963.
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of RICO predicate offenses.3 7 Congress amended section 1963 to
provide that conviction under RICO shall result in the forfeiture of:
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in
violation of section 1962;
(2) any(A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over; any enterprise which
the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation
of section 1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly,
from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection in
violation of section 1962.38
Congress specifically revised section 1963 by including language mandating the forfeiture of property derived from proceeds
of the illegal conduct and including language requiring the sentencing court to impose the forfeiture penalty.5 9 As a result, RICO
37. CFA, §§ 301, 302 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992) (setting forth criminal penalties upon violation of § 1962)). Amended section 1962 establishes the following prohibited activities:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of
such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of
the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
38. CFA, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 302, 98 Stat. 2040 (1984) (amending RICO, 18
U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (1970)).
39. RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (a) (3) (1988) (as amended by CFA, § 302).
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forfeiture may include the seizure of "the entire stock of a proprietor's inventory, regardless of its content," 40 including the seizure of
constitutionally protected material prior to its dissemination.
2. 1984 Amendments - The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 Obscenity Added as a Predicate Offense
In 1984, Congress also added a new predicate offense to RICO,
dealing in obscene matter, further expanding RICO's scope. 4 1 As a
result of this new predicate offense, violation of a state or federal
obscenity statute may be a RICO offense under section 1962 if prosecutors also establish "a pattern of racketeering activity." 4 2 Once
prosecutors allege a RICO violation, federal investigatory and
prosecutorial resources may be used to aid in the preparation of
43
the government's case.
The creation of the obscenity predicate offense represents congressional expansion of RICO into areas that have free speech
ramifications. 44 The new predicate offense of dealing in obscene
matter was added with little debate regarding its First Amendment
implications. 4 5 The sole "debate" consisted of North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms' statements and submission of materials that were
intended to show organized crime's use of pornography to expand
46
organized crime's power.
40. Eggenberger, supra note 19, at 79; see RICO 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1)-(3)
(1988).
41. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020(1),
98 Stat. 2143 (1984) (codified at RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1988)). Before
1984, predicate offenses constituting racketeering activity included the following:
murder, kidnapping, gambling, bribery, extortion and dealing in illegal drugs.
RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)(1988). These offenses may subject the defendant
to RICO charges under state or federal law. Id. § 1961(1) (A)-(B).
42. RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
43. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat. 922) 1073; see also 130 CONG. REC. at 844 (statement of Sen.
Helms).
44. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2777 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
45. See id. at 2778 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
46. 130 CONG. REC. 844-69 (daily ed.Jan. 30, 1984). Senator Helms urged the
adoption of this amendment so that organized crime's involvement in pornography would be subject to RICO and, therefore, be under the control of federal
authorities. Id. at 869. Many of the articles Senator Helms inserted into the Congressional Record claim that pornography generates a large amount of income for
organized crime. See, e.g., id. at 868 (REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED
CRIME, Dec. 1976) (stating low overhead costs and high mark-up of pornographic
material result in large profits for dealers). It is interesting to note that Senator
Helms refers to pornography rather than obscenity since pornography is protected
expression under the First Amendment. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
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B.

Seizure of Obscene Material

Procedures that permit the seizure of expressive material
47
before an adjudication of obscenity rarely survive judicial scrutiny.
However, application of the RICO forfeiture provisions satisfies due
process because the government must convict a defendant of a
predicate offense before it seizes the defendant's assets. 48

Not all

seizures of expressive material require such a conviction. For example, the Supreme Court has consistently held that minimum due
process requires a hearing resolving the issue of obscenity before
the government can seize expressive material. 49 The Supreme
Court has explored the procedural requirements of seizing obscene
material in three significant cases.
In the first of the three cases, the Court required at least a
hearing on the issue of the material's obscenity before seizure is
permissible. 50 In Marcus v. Search Warrant of 104 East Tenth Street,5 1
the Supreme Court held that the pretrial seizure of expressive material is constitutional only when the owner of the expressive material received procedural protection in the form of a hearing
"designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity." 52 The
Court elaborated, stating that procedures which "focus searchingly
on the question of obscenity"55 will vary depending on the circum54
stances of the seizure.
In the second case, the Court detailed the procedural requirements left unexpressed in Marcus. In Heler v. New York, 55 the Court
explained that different procedures are required when obscene material is seized to preserve evidence than those procedues used
when obscene material is seized to prevent its circulation. 56 The
47. See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 63 (1989) (holding
pretrial seizure of contents of bookstore was improper where there was no adversary hearing on issue of obscenity); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492 (1973)
(stating seizure of film is constitutionally permissible only when taken for evidentiary purposes, when based on film's probable obscenity and when followed by
prompt judicial determination of obscenity); Marcus v. Search Warrant of 104 E.

Tenth St., 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961).
48. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772.
49. See Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 63; HeUer, 413 U.S. at 492; Marcus, 367

U.S. at 732.
50. Marcus, 367 U.S. at 732.

51. 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
52. Id. at 732.
53. Id.
54. Heller, 413 U.S. at 488-91.
55. Id.
56. Id. In a civil setting there are different procedures governing the regulation of expressive material. In Freedman v. Maryland, the Court set forth procePublished by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
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Court in Heller required that an adversary proceeding result in a
judicial determination of obscenity in criminal cases before all cop57
ies of the expressive item are seized.
In Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,58 the last of the three cases,
the Court added to the Heller standard. The Court stated that prosecutors must first establish probable cause to believe an obscenity
offense occurred, after which they may seize only one copy of the
expressive item. 59 In Fort Wayne Books, a state court authorized the
seizure of property based only on a finding of probable cause that a
RICO violation had occurred; the defendant was not convicted
before the government seized the expressive material. 6° The
Supreme Court held that "the publication may not be taken out of
circulation completely until there has been a determination of obscenity after an adversary hearing." 6 1 The Court held that the risk

dural safeguards for civil cases where expressive material must be submitted to a
censor for approval and licensing before exhibition or distribution. 380 U.S. 51,
58-59 (1965). First, the censor has the burden of proving that the film (or material) is obscene. Id. at 58. Second, the censor's decision regarding whether or not
the film is obscene may not be final; restraint of the film's distribution or exhibition is permissible for only a limited time, until a judicial determination can be
made. Id. at 58-59. Finally, in cases where the censor refuses to issue a license to
exhibit, "a prompt final judicial decision" is required. Id. at 59. These safeguards
were implemented to avoid censorship caused by delay or arbitrary decisions.
The Court applied the Freedman procedural safeguards in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560-62 (1975). Southeastern Promotions
was a corporation that promoted and presented theatrical productions. Id. at 547.
Southeastern Promotions applied to a municipal board for a permit to perform
the musical Hair,but the board denied the application. Id. at 547-48. The municipal board members responsible for scheduling events at the theater did not see the
musical prior to their decision to deny the application. Id. The board's decision
was based on "outside reports" of the content of the production. Id. at 548. The
Supreme Court held that the board's rejection of the application to perform the
musical production constituted a prior restraint because there were no procedural
safeguards. Id. at 560-62.
57. See Heler,413 U.S. at 491. The Heler Court stated that seizure of a single
copy of a film or magazine for the purpose of keeping it as evidence, with other
copies of the item still in the possession of the exhibitor, is constitutionally permissible. Id. However, the seizure must be based on a warrant supported by probable
cause, issued by a neutral magistrate and promptly followed by a judicial determination of obscenity in an adversarial proceeding. Id. at 492.
58. 489 U.S. 46, 63 (1989). Indiana used its RICO statute, which is similar to
the federal RICO statute, to seize expressive material based upon a showing of
probable cause of a RICO violation. Id. at 51.
59. Id. at 63.
60. Id. The state court did not determine that the seized material was
obscene.
61. Id.
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125

of prior restraint gives "presumptively protected" material special
62
protection against Fourth Amendment searches and seizures.
Therefore, while probable cause is sufficient to seize evidence,
it is insufficient to disrupt the circulation of expressive material due
to the risk of prior restraint.63 The development of procedural protections for expressive material illustrates the Supreme Court's concern with preventing prior restraint.
C.

Definition of Prior Restraint

Identifying an action as a prior restraint is complicated by the
lack of consensus regarding how the doctrine should be defined
and applied. 64 Commentators provide different definitions of prior
restraint. Professor Melville Nimmer defined prior restraint as an
"administrative or judicial order[ ] forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications
are to occur."6 5 In contrast, Professor Martin Redish defined prior
restraint as "a form of speech regulation ... that limits expression
prior to a full and fair hearing in an independent judicial forum to
determine whether the challenged expression is constitutionally
66
protected."
The government takes action amounting to a prior restraint
when it suppresses or restrains speech before it occurs. 6 7 This
threat of government-sanctioned censorship of material before
public distribution makes prior restraint a disfavored method of
controlling speech. 68 In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,69 the Court
62. Id. at 63-64 (citing Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985)); see also
Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973) (holding "seizure reasonable as to
one type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a different setting or
with respect to another kind of material").
63. Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 66; see also New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475
U.S. 868, 874-76 (1986). No separate standard of probable cause is necessary to
seize expressive material to preserve it as evidence of an obscenity offense. Heller
v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492 (1973).
64. Jeffrey A- Smith, PriorRestraint: OriginalIntentions and Modern Interpretations, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 439, 463 (1987).
65. MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, § 4.03, at 4-14
(1984).
66. Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REv. 53, 75 (1984).
67. See Near v. Minnesota ex reL Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 712 (1931).
68. In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, the Court characterized the prior restraint as the "most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). The Court stated that prior restraints
freeze speech and create self-censorship, thereby violating First Amendment principles of free speech. Id. at 559.
69. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
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stated "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
70
validity."
Although temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions are typical examples of prior restraints, 7 1 the Court has not
limited the application of the prior restraint doctrine to these two
examples. For instance, in Bantam Books, a state-sponsored commission sent threatening notices to publishers and wholesale distributors of expressive material. 72 The commission targeted books,
pictures and songs which it believed promoted immorality. 73 The
Court found that these notices, which notified distributors of the
objectionable nature of the books and the commission's duty to
recommend prosecution, were prior restraints because they subjected "the distribution of publications to a system of prior adminis74
trative restraints."
The Court in Bantam Books determined that the commission's
notices constituted a prior restraint by analyzing the notices' restraining effect on free speech. 75 The Court found that the commission's notices had a regulatory effect because they served as
more than legal advice. The notices prevented certain material
from reaching the public. 76 The Court stated that the notices' purpose was to censor speech by fostering self-censorship. 77 The Court
stated that the commission's actions circumvented the criminal process and its procedural safeguards in order to censor speech with70. Id. at 70. A compelling state interest will, however, justify the imposition
of a prior restraint. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). Additionally, a
prior restraint is constitutionally permissible when the speech that is prohibited is
not protected by the First Amendment. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543
(1992) (stating that prior restraint of "fighting words" is valid because "fighting
words" are not protected speech under First Amendment).
71. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771; see also Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.,
445 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1980) (holding injunction to prevent showing allegedly obscene films unconstitutional); Near, 283 U.S. at 701-02 (holding statute enjoining
publication of "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or
other periodical" unconstitutional prior restraint of speech).
72. Bantam Books, 372 U.S at 61.
73. Id. at 59-62. The Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth had no
judicial, legislative or enforcement powers. Id. at 67. The Commission's purpose
was to notify distributors of the potentially obscene nature of their merchandise.
Id. at 59-62. Additionally, the Commission prepared lists of potentially obscene
material and sent them to local police departments. Id. at 62-63.
74. Id. at 70.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 68-69.
77. Id.
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out judicial involvement. 78 The Court also stated that it would
ignore the form and analyze the effect of the restraint to "recognize
that informal censorship may sufficiently inhibit the circulation of
79
publications" in a manner that deserves judicially granted relief.
The purpose and the effect of the statute, therefore, are critical
factors in the constitutional analysis of the prior restraint.80
D.

Definition of Subsequent Punishment

The conflict in Alexander involved characterizing the governmental action as either a prior restraint or a subsequent punishment.8 ' Subsequent punishment is a concept that is basic to the
concept of criminal penalties. It is not, however, always easy to distinguish subsequent punishment from prior restraint.
"[L]aws which punish speech or expression only after it has occurred and been found unlawful" have been characterized as examples of subsequent punishment. 82 The Supreme Court briefly
addressed the permissible scope of subsequent punishment in Near
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson.8 3 In Near, the Court held that punishment
for speech offenses is constitutionally permissible, but the Court refused to "inquire as to the permissible scope of subsequent punishment" because that issue was not before the Court. 84 Therefore,
78. Id. at 70. The Court noted that a prior restraint is constitutional in limited circumstances where there is judicial supervision and an immediate determination of the validity of the restraint. Id.
79. Id. at 67; see also Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957)
(encouraging evaluation of operation and effect of statute); Near v. Minnesota ex
rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) (evaluating form of restraint is not sufficient;
operation and effect must also be evaluated).
80. Near, 283 U.S. at 709. In Near, the Court held unconstitutional a public
nuisance statute that authorized injunctions as punishment to prevent future publication of "a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other
periodical" based on past violations. Id. at 701-03. The Court evaluated the statute's purpose and effect to determine whether it was constitutional. Id. The Court
found that the statute was used to stop the distribution of "scandalous matter" in
an effort to protect public welfare. Id. at 709-10. The Minnesota statute was not
intended to "redress [ ] individual or private wrongs." Id. The Court found that
the statute targeted continued publication of scandalous charges against public
officials and that the object of the statute was suppression of this type of speech,
not punishment for publishing it. Id. at 711. The Court found that prior restraint
of speech was the object and effect of the statute because the statute achieved
suppression of speech through the issuance of a permanent injunction. Id.
81. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2779-80 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2779. In Southeastern Promotions,Ltd. v. Conrad,the Court stated that
.a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they
break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand." 420 U.S. 546, 559
(1975).
83. 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
84. Id. at 715.
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punishment is permissible, but the scope of that punishment may
85
be limited by the Constitution in First Amendment situations.
Supreme Court decisions since Near have shed little light on
the constitutional limits of subsequent punishment. In Fort Wayne
Books, the Court did not examine the issue of whether the nonobscene contents of a bookstore would be forfeited under Indiana's
RICO statute because the seizure was procedurally defective.8 6 Similarly, the Court avoided this issue in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.8 7 In
Arcara, an adult bookstore was closed by ajudicial order authorized
under a public health statute. 88 The Court interpreted the closing
of the bookstore as punishment for conviction of a criminal
offense.8 9
85. Id. In Near, the issue was whether punishment for criminal libel was permissible under the Constitution. Id. Although the Court found that punishment
for libel was permissible, it noted that the Minnesota statute involved a suppression
of speech, not a punishment. Id.
86. Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 65. The Court assumed that the nonobscene
assets were forfeitable in order to dispose of the case. Id. The Court stated that it
would not address the issue of whether the nonobscene material was forfeitable
because such a determination was not necessary to resolve the case. Id. at 65 n. 11.
Thus the Court refused to address whether post-trial forfeiture was constitutional
under Indiana's RICO statute. Id.
87. 478 U.S. 697, 699-700 (1986). However, in Alexander, the Court cited Arcara to support its holding that forfeiture was an acceptable punishment under the
Constitution. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772 (citing Arcara, 478 U.S. at 700).
88. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 699; see N.Y. PuB. HEALH LAw §§ 2320, 2329 (McKinney 1985). Section 2320 provides:
1. Whoever shall erect, establish, continue, maintain, use, own, or
lease any building, erection, or place used for the purpose of lewdness,
assignation, or prostitution is guilty of maintaining a nuisance.
2. The building, erection, or place, or the ground itself, in or upon
which any lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is conducted, permitted,
or carried on, continued, or exists, and the furniture, fixtures, musical
instruments, and movable property used in conducting or maintaining
such nuisance, are hereby declared to be a nuisance and shall be enjoined and abated as hereafter provided.
Id. Section 2329 provides:
1. If the existence of the nuisance be admitted or established in an
action as provided in this article, or in a criminal proceeding in any court
order, an order of abatement shall be entered as part of the judgement in
the case, which order... shall direct the effectual closing of the building,
erection or place against its use for any purpose, and so keeping it closed
for a period of one year ....
Id.
89. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 706. The Court was careful to distinguish the closure
order from a prior restraint. Id. at 705-06 n.2. The closure order did not restrict
the circulation of the material in the bookstore when it was closed. Id. The trial
court did not issue the closure order based on the nature of the material in the
store. Id. In fact, the "closure order ha[d] nothing to do with any expressive conduct at all." Id.
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Arcara differed from both Fort Wayne Books and Alexander because no expressive material was forfeited in Arcara,90 In Arcara,
the state closed the bookstore without seizing its contents. 91 The
state did not prevent the defendants from conducting business in a
new location. 92 In Alexander, however, the forfeited assets included
expressive material taken after conviction of RICO and obscenity
offenses. The RICO forfeiture provisions illustrate the difficulty in
defining governmental action as an unconstitutional prior restraint
or a valid subsequent criminal punishment.
III.

DISCUSSION

A.

Facts

Ferris Alexander owned an adult entertainment business for
over thirty years in Minneapolis, Minnesota. 93 Alexander owned
thirteen retail stores, where he sold sexually explicit materials. 94 In
1989, Alexander was indicted on thirty-four federal obscenity
95
charges and three RICO charges.
90. Id. at 699-700. The only "asset" forfeited in Arcara was the use of the
building where the bookstore was located. Id.
91. Id. In Arcara, the Court noted that any penalty could conceivably burden
First Amendment protected material or activities; therefore, the court required
scrutiny of the penalty. Id. at 706. According to the Court, the United States v.
O'Brien least restrictive means test should be used when regulating conduct with a
significant expressive element. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 706-07 (citing United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). The O'Brien test is also used when a "statute based
on a nonexpressive activity has the inevitable effect of singling out those engaged
in expressive activity." Id. The four part O'Brien test requires:
that a governmental regulation... [be] within the constitutional power of
the government; [the regulation] further[ ] an important or substantial
governmental interest; [ ] the governmental interest [be] unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and [any] incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms [be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
391 U.S. at 376-77. In Arcara, the Court held that the judicial order closing the
bookstore was not subject to the O'Brien test. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 707.
92. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 706. The Court held that the "First Amendment is not
implicated by the enforcement of a public health regulation of general application
against the physical premises in which [defendants] happen to sell books." Id. at
707.
93. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769.
94. Id. As part of his business, Alexander sold pornographic magazines, sexual paraphernalia and he rented and sold sexually explicit videotapes. Id.
95. Id. Alexander was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1465 for transporting obscene material in interstate commerce in order to sell or distribute it and under 18
U.S.C. § 1466 for selling obscene material. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770. Alexander was charged under § 1962(a) of RICO for using income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, under § 1962(c) for conducting a RICO enterprise
and § 1962(d) for conspiring to conduct a RICO enterprise. Id.
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Alexander was convicted on seventeen of the thirty-four obscenity counts and the three RICO counts in a jury trial before the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. 96 He received a six year prison term and the court ordered him to pay a
$100,000 fine.9 7 The jury found that Alexander used his property

and money to "conduct his racketeering enterprise."9 8 Pursuant to
RICO section 1963(a), the court ordered Alexander to forfeit his
wholesale and retail business property and approximately nine million dollars worth of equipment and inventory. 99
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, Alexander argued that the RICO forfeiture provisions constituted a prior restraint on speech and as such violated the First
Amendment.' ° Alexander did not challenge the forfeiture of the
obscene material. He challenged only the forfeiture of the nonobscene material. Alexander argued that the forfeited expressive material had not been adjudicated obscene. Therefore, the First
Amendment protected the expressive material which could not be
seized as a subsequent punishment.' 0 ' The Eighth Circuit rejected
10 2
Alexander's argument and affirmed the district court's decision.
The court characterized the forfeiture as a legitimate criminal pen03
alty rather than a prior restraint.
96. Id. at 2769-70. The jury determined that three videos and four magazines
were obscene. Id. The jury found Alexander guilty on five counts of engaging in
the business of selling obscene material under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1466, twelve counts of transporting obscene material in interstate commerce for
the purpose of sale or distribution under 18 U.S.C. § 1465, one count of receiving
and using income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO,
§ 1962(a), one count of conducting a racketeering enterprise under RICO,
§ 1962(c) and one count of conspiring to conduct a racketeering enterprise under

RICO, § 1962(d). Id.
97. Id. The costs of prosecution, incarceration and supervised release were
added to Alexander's fine. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. Section 1963(a) (2) (A) provides for the forfeiture of property which
represents the defendant's interest in the racketeering enterprise. RICO, 18
U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2) (A) (1988). Section 1963(a) (2) (D) provides for forfeiture of
property that afforded the defendant influence over the enterprise. RICO, 18
U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2) (D) (1988). Sections 1963(a)(1) and 1963(a) (3) provide for
the forfeiture of assets and proceeds that the defendant obtained from the racketeering offenses. RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1), (3) (1988).
100. Alexander v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 825, 834 (8th Cir. 1991). Alexander
also claimed that the application of the RICO forfeiture provisions violated the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 827.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The Eighth Circuit rejected Alexander's reliance on Fort Wayne Books
by pointing to factual differences between the cases. Alexander, 943 F.2d at 834; see
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 62-63 (1989). The Alexander Court
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The Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's holding that
the seizure of nonobscene, expressive material, pursuant to RICO
forfeiture provisions, did not violate the First Amendment. 104 The
Court rejected Alexander's argument that the forfeiture was a prior
restraint on speech.10 5 Instead, the Court characterized the forfeiture as a subsequent penalty for the commission of numerous criminal offenses.10 6 As such, the Court found that the First Amendment
07
protection of freedom of speech was not compromised.
B.
1.

Narrative Analysis

The Alexander Majority Opinion

First, the Alexander majority discussed the prior restraint and
subsequent punishment doctrines, rejecting Alexander's argument
that the forfeiture was a prior restraint.10 8 Second, the Court evaluated the due process requirements involved in this type of forfeiture.'0 9 Third, the Court supported its holding by comparing
Alexander to previous decisions involving similar issues."10 Fourth,
the Court discussed the impact and legitimacy of the chilling effect
that would likely occur as a result of this decision.'' Finally, the
Court evaluated Alexander's argument that the forfeiture violated
the Eighth Amendment as an excessive fine or cruel and unusual
held that Fort Wayne Books involved a pretrial seizure of expressive material; therefore, it was not comparable to Alexander's postconviction seizure. Alexander, 113
S. Ct. at 2772 (citing Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 62-63). The Eighth Circuit believed that the differences between prior restraints and subsequent criminal punishments were substantial. Alexander, 943 F.2d at 834. The court stated that "[t] he
First Amendment is not violated when there is a nexus established between the illgotten gains from racketeering activity and the protected materials forfeited." Id.
The court also rejected Alexander's arguments that the forfeiture provisions were
constitutionally overbroad and that the forfeiture created an unconstitutional chilling effect on free speech. Id.
104. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772-73.
105. Id. at 2772. Specifically, Alexander argued that the seizure of expressive
material based solely on previous obscenity offenses was a prior restraint. According to Alexander, this type of forfeiture prohibits "future presumptively protected
expression in retaliation for prior unprotected speech." Id. at 2770-71. For a discussion of the Court's definition of prior restraint, see supra notes 64-80 and accompanying text.
106. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770-71.
107. Id. However, the Court remanded the case because the Eighth Circuit
failed to consider fully Alexander's Eighth Amendment argument. Id. at 2769.
108. Id. at 2770-72.
109. Id. at 2772.
110. Id. at 2774-75.
111. Id. at 2774.
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punishment. 1 2 Each of these positions of the majority will be addressed in turn.
The Alexander majority began its analysis by rejecting Alexander's characterization of the forfeiture order. 133 Alexander claimed
that the order was a prior restraint of his speech, not a subsequent
punishment, 1 4 and that the order "indiscriminately prohibit[ed] future presumptively protected expression simply as retaliation for a
prior speech violation."" 5 The Court stated that the "solidly
grounded" distinctions between prior restraints and subsequent
punishments that it established in prior cases would be eliminated
if it accepted Alexander's argument. 116 The Court was unclear as
to how this would occur or what the distinctions were between prior
restraints and subsequent punishments.
The Alexander majority stated that a prior restraint was an "'administrative [or] judicial order[ ] forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications
are to occur.'"" 7 The Court used this definition as it evaluated the
differences between the RICO forfeiture provisions and the two
"classic examples" of prior restraint: temporary restraining orders
and permanent injunctions." 8 The Court concluded that the
RICO provisions involved in this case neither enjoined speech nor
required "prior approval for any expressive activities." 1 9 Stating
that the RICO provisions did not impede Alexander's freedom to
establish a new business, the Court noted that Alexander, assuming
he had "sufficient untainted assets," could establish new businesses

112. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2775.
113. Id. at 2770-73.
114. Id. at 2770.
115. Brief for Petitioner at 19, Alexander, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
116. Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2771. The Court did not provide any authority to
illustrate this "solidly grounded" distinction. The Court also did not provide a
definition of subsequent punishment.
117. Id. (quoting

NIMMER,

supra note 65, § 4.03, at 4-14). The Court did not

consider the seizure of nonobscene material as forbidding Alexander from engaging in future speech. Id.
118. Id.; see also NIMMER, supra note 65, § 4.03, at 4-16.
119. A/exander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771.
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immediately.' 2 0 The RICO provisions merely authorized the
2
seizure of Alexander's tainted assets at the time of his conviction.' '
The fact that not all of the forfeited material was obscene was
not an important factor in the Court's evaluation. 122 The Court
stated the material was seized because it was part of a business used
to commit racketeering offenses.12 3 The Court elaborated on this
point, stating that the forfeiture "statute [wa]s oblivious to the expressive or nonexpressive nature of the assets forfeited." 2 4 If the
Court did not enforce the forfeiture portions of the statute, the
Court believed that "racketeers [would] evade forfeiture by investing
the proceeds of their crimes in businesses engaging in expressive
25
activity."'
The Court next evaluated whether Alexander was afforded his
due process rights. The Court found that Alexander received due
process and, therefore, it concluded that the forfeiture was constitutional.' 26 The "requisite procedural safeguards" were satisfied because Alexander had been given a jury trial on the obscenity and
RICO charges.' 27 The Court held that the seizure was constitu120. Id. "Untainted" assets are those assets that are unrelated to the racketeering activity. Id. The Alexander majority stated that if Alexander had enough
money which originated independently of his previous businesses, he could open
another adult entertainment business. Id. However, Alexander would have to rebuild the entire enterprise because all of his assets were seized. Id. at 2769-70. The
expressive material was destroyed while his business equipment and real estate
were sold. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Alexander, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993); see Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2770 (stating that government chose to destroy materials rather
than go into business of selling them).
121. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771; see RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992).
122. Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2771-72.
123. Id. at 2772. The Alexander majority stated that suspicion of obscenity was
not the reason for the forfeiture in this case as it had been in previous prior restraint cases. Id.; see Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 310-11
(1980) (involving statute that enjoined exhibition of films not yet adjudicated obscene upon showing that theater previously exhibited obscene films); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 59-61 (1963) (invalidating statute authorizing
nonlegal notification of objectionable material and possible criminal sanctions resulting from sale of material).
124. Alexander, 113 S. CL at 2772.
125. Id. The Alexander majority was fearful that such a ruling might encourage the activity that Congress was trying to eliminate when Congress added
dealing in obscenity as a predicate offense to RICO. Id.; see 130 CONG. Rc. 844
(daily ed. Jan. 30, 1984). For a further discussion of the addition of obscenity as a
predicate offense, see supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
126. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772.
127. Id. The Court compared Alexander to Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
489 U.S. 46 (1989), where the Court held that a pretrial seizure based on probable
cause of a RICO violation was unconstitutional. Compare Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at
2772 with Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 62.
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tional because federal prosecutors "proved beyond a reasonable
128
doubt the basis of the forfeiture."
The Court justified its conclusions by comparing Alexander to
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.129 In Arcara, an adult bookstore was
closed by a court order authorized under a public health statute. 30
The Court refused to characterize the closure order as an improper
restraint on speech,1 3 ' noting that the order was not based on the
content of the material sold by the bookstore.' 3 2 The order was
based on the nonspeech related conduct that occurred in the building. As such, the Court found that closure of the store was a per133
missible punishment for violating the public health statute.
34
In Alexander, the Court applied the analysis it used in Arcara.'
The Court found that the RICO forfeiture order, like the closure
35
order in Arcara, was a punishment for "past criminal conduct."
The Court concluded that to hold otherwise would "undermine the
time-honored distinction between barring speech in the future and
penalizing past speech." 13 6 The Court noted that its decisions have
128. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772. The basis of the forfeiture was dealing in
obscene matter, a violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). Id
129. Compare Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772 with Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,
478 U.S. 697, 705-06 (1986).
130. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772. For the text of the public health statutes at
issue in Arcara,see supranote 88. The bookstore violated the statute by permitting
acts of prostitution and lewdness on the premises. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 699. A deputy sheriff personally observed this conduct. He testified that the manager of the
store was "fully aware of the sexual activity on the premises." Id.
131. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 707. The Arcara Court differentiated the closure order from prior restraint because the defendant was free to conduct business at a
new location. Id. at 705-06 n.2. Additionally, the closure order was not imposed as
a result of the distribution of prohibited material. Id.
132. Id. at 698-99. The closure order was based on "illicit sexual activities occurring on respondents' premises." Id.
133. Id. at 705-06.
134. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772. The Court used the same reasoning in
Alexander that it used in Arcara to differentiate subsequent punishment from prior
restraint. Id. The forfeiture order did not prohibit future conduct because Alexander was free to open new businesses and the order was not issued without prior
determination that the material was obscene. Id. (citing Arcara, 478 U.S. at 705-06
n.2).
135. Id. Alexander argued that obscenity differed from prostitution or lewdness because obscenity has a "significant expressive element." Id. (quoting Brief
for Petitioner at 16, Alexander, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993)). The Court rejected this
argument by saying the expressive element had no bearing on whether the forfeiture order was an improper prior restraint. Id.
136. Id. The Court has interpreted the First Amendment as providing
greater protection" from a prior restraint than from a subsequent punishment.
Id.; see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975). In
Southeastern Promotions, the Court stated that a free society prefers to punish lawbreakers after a violation rather than to cut them off before they have a chance to
speak. Id. at 559.
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consistently upheld the distinctions between prior restraints and
subsequent punishments.13 7 The Court reasoned that if it held that
the forfeiture order were a prior restraint, the precision of Professor Nimmer's definition would be ruined because the court did not
view the RICO forfeiture provisions as anything other than a subsel3 8
quent punishment.
The next major issue addressed by the Court was the possibility
of a "chilling effect" on speech if the RICO forfeiture provisions
were enforced.' 39 The Court admitted that self-censorship might
occur, but it denied that self-censorship in this context violated the
First Amendment. 140 The Court, quoting Fort Wayne Books, stated
that some self-censorship was a likely and acceptable result of enforcement of antiobscenity laws. 14 1 The Court found that deterrence in the form of removal of "marginally protected materials" is
14 2
a legitimate goal of antiobscenity laws.
The Court found that the threat of forfeiture as a punishment
was no different than the threat of fines or imprisonment, the punishments at issue in Fort Wayne Books. 143 The Court noted that the
possibility of a chilling effect would remain constant whether the
threat of punishment was forfeiture or a prison term.' 44 Additionally, the Court emphasized that loss of liberty, such as imprison45
ment, is more extreme than loss of money or property.
The Court next rejected Alexander's argument that it was unconstitutional to seize business assets when the RICO predicate acts
were obscenity offenses.' 4 6 The Court held that sanctions which
137. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2773. The Court's discussion is unclear as to the
substance of these distinctions.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2774. Additionally, the Court rejected Alexander's argument that
the RICO forfeiture provisions were overbroad because the provisions authorized
the seizure of nonobscene material. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner at 36, Alexander,
113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993). The Alexander majority rejected this argument because,
although RICO authorized seizure of constitutionally protected speech, it "[did]
not criminalize constitutionally protected speech." Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2774.
The Court distinguished Alexander from its previous overbreadth decisions. Cf.
Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews forJesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574-75 (1987). The
Court recharacterized Alexander's overbreadth argument as a chilling effect argument. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2774.
140. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2774.
141. Id.; see Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 60 (1989).
142. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2774.
143. Id.; Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 59.
144. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2774.
145. Id. The Court did not believe that the threat of forfeiture created a
greater chilling effect than a fine or prison term. Id.; see also Blanton v. North Las
Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989).
146. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2774-75.
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had some "incidental effect on First Amendment activities [we]re
subject to First Amendment scrutiny" only when the conduct that
triggered the punishment had a significant expressive component. 4 7 The Court determined that the conduct at issue could be
characterized as expressive.' 48 However, the Alexander majority
stated that previous cases permitted the regulation or prohibition
of obscenity. Therefore, the forfeiture of Alexander's property did
not violate the First Amendment.149
The Alexander majority concluded by evaluating Alexander's
Eighth Amendment argument. 5 0° Alexander argued that the forfeiture order, in addition to the fine and prison term, was unfair given
the seriousness of his crime.' 5 ' Alexander alternatively argued that
the forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment either as a "cruel
and unusual punishment or as an excessive fine."' 5 2 The Court
held that these two concepts were distinct components of the
Eighth Amendment and, therefore, should not be evaluated together. 15 3 The Court held that the Eighth Circuit should have evaluated the forfeiture, not under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, but separately under the Excessive Fines Clause.' 5 4 The
Court vacated this portion of the Eighth Circuit's decision and remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit for consideration of this
55
issue. 1

147. Id. at 2775.
148. Id. For a discussion of the test used to determine expressiveness, see
supra note 91.
149. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2775; see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23
(1973) (allowing regulation and proscription of obscenity); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
150. Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2775.
151. Id.
152. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 40, Alexander, 113 S.Ct. 2766 (1993)).
153. Id. at 2775. The Eighth Circuit did not distinguish the two components,
stating that it was not obliged to review the proportionality of a "sentence less than
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole." Alexander v. Thornburgh,
943 F.2d 825, 836 (8th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court, however, noted that this principle is applicable only to the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2775.
154. Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2776. In Austin v. United States, the Court held
that the "Excessive Fines Clause limits the Government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense." 113 S.Ct.
2801, 2805-06 (1993) (emphasis in original). The Alexander Court held that the
forfeiture was a "monetary punishment" that was the equivalent of a fine. Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2775-76.
155. Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2776.
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The Alexander Dissent

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, and
in part by Justice Souter, 56 dissented, calling the majority opinion a
"grave repudiation of First Amendment principles." 15 7 The dissent
stated that the majority's reasoning was flawed because it did not
distinguish among different types of punishment. 58 The dissent
argued that a forfeiture penalty, compared to a prison term or fine,
produced a vastly different result, particularly in the First Amendment context.' 59 The dissent stated that when "protected titles and
the facilities for their distribution and publication" are destroyed,
the punishment is of a different character than traditional criminal
punishments such as prison terms and fines.' 6 0 The dissent argued
that the constitutional analysis of forfeiture provisions should be
different than the analysis of traditional punishments.1 6 ' The dissent pointed out that the cases relied upon by the majority, specifically Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana 62 and Arcara v. Cloud Books,
Inc.,16 did not address First Amendment concerns relevant to forfeiture issues.'6
156. Justice Souter concurred with the majority's opinion because he did not
believe that the forfeiture was a prior restraint. Id. (SouterJ., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). However, Justice Souter joined the dissent because he agreed
that the forfeiture of expressive material before it was adjudicated obscene violated
the First Amendment. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). This
Note will use the singular of dissent for simplicity.
157. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 2777 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
159. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated that the forfeiture
of expressive material implicates First Amendment issues because defendants are
directly prevented from distributing the material seized, whereas a defendant who
is fined or imprisoned may continue to distribute the material as long as the business is still operating. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy pointed out that Congress
intended RICO forfeiture to have a different effect than traditional punishments
because RICO forfeitures were intended to destroy the economic basis of the
source of the racketeering activity. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
161. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dissent noted that forfeiture penalties "are the subject of historic disfavor in our country." Id. at 2778
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent also criticized the lack of congressional debate concerning the First Amendment implications of adding obscenity as a new
predicate offense. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

162. 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
163. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
164. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2778-79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent
stated: "We did not consider in Fort Wayne Books the First Amendment implications
of extensive penal forfeitures, including the official destruction of protected expression." Id. at 2779 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent also stated that the
Court would not scrutinize a penalty under the First Amendment where the conduct could not be characterized as protected expression as in Arcara. Id. at 2778
(KennedyJ., dissenting) (citing Arcara, 478 U.S. at 705). In Arcara, the conduct at
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The dissent also criticized the majority's prior restraint analyNoting that the distinction between prior restraint and subsequent punishment is not absolutely precise, the dissent argued
that the majority should not have used a static definition of prior
restraint.1 66 The dissent encouraged the use of a dynamic view of
the prior restraint doctrine so that the doctrine could flexibly "adjust to meet new threats to speech."1 6 7 The dissent stated "[i]t is a
flat misreading of our precedents to declare as the majority does
that the definition of a prior restraint includes only those measures
which impose a 'legal impediment,' .. . to engage in future expressive activity." 168 The dissent urged the majority to analyze governmental action based on its substance and its tendency to suppress
expressive activity. 169
The dissent sharply criticized the majority's use of a formalistic
analysis, encouraging the use of a flexible definition of prior restraint. 70 The dissent used Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson'7 ' to illustrate a prior restraint that was not a classic example of a prior
restraint. 72 Faced with the Near case today, the dissent believed
73
that the Alexander majority would uphold the statute in Near.1
The dissent questioned the majority's dismissal of Alexander's
argument that the forfeiture order was a prior restraint because the
forfeiture was imposed after Alexander's conviction on the RICO
and obscenity charges. 7 4 The dissent believed that the constitusis.165

issue had no expressive component; therefore, the Alexander dissent believed it was
inapposite. See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 698-99.
165. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2779 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the majority's categorization of prior restraint led, in this case, to government-sanctioned censorship. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
pointed out that the majority neglected to address this issue. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
166. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The majority's definition appears to include only official governmental orders. See id. at 2771. For definitions of prior
restraint, see supra notes 64-80 and accompanying text. The dissent noted that
"some governmental actions may have the characteristics both of punishment and
prior restraint." Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2780 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
167. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2779 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2782 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (holding state commission's warnings of possible prosecution for obscenity offenses constituted prior restraint).
169. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2782 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent implied that the effect of self-censorship served as an indication that the forfeiture
was a prior restraint. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
171. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
172. Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2781 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
174. Id. at 2783 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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tional analysis of the RICO forfeiture provisions should be different
when the provisions were used to punish violations of obscenity
1 75
statutes.
The dissent encouraged a rigorous First Amendment analysis
to avoid "the evils of state censorship and the unacceptable chilling
of protected speech" through the application of nontraditional
penalties.1 7 6 Noting that freedom of speech was "vulnerable to
gravely damaging yet barely visible encroachments," 177 the dissent
argued that First Amendment issues must be considered when regulating or punishing speech.' 78 According to Justice Kennedy, the
majority's analysis of the First Amendment concerns in Alexander
allows the government to "suppress a particular class of disfavored
speech." 179 Additionally, the dissent believed that the majority
opinion holds speakers responsible for "all of their expression
80
based on some errant expression in the past."
In Part Two of his dissent, Justice Kennedy addressed the destruction of expressive material where there had been no adjudication of obscenity and stated that this result had "no parallel" in the
Court's previous decisions.' 8 ' The dissent disagreed with the majority's use of Arcara, the only case the majority used in support of
its forfeiture argument. Justice Kennedy observed that in Arcara no
expressive material had been seized.' 8 2 The judicial order required
only closure of the store; the material could be sold at another location without restriction.' 8 3 Alexander differed from Arcara because
expressive material was seized and destroyed in Alexander.8 4 Justice
175. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent assumed that the RICO forfeiture provisions were constitutional when applied to seizures punishing nonspeech
related offenses. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,

525 (1958)).
178. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The majority addressed the issue of punishment for violation of obscenity statutes and determined that punishment for
such offenses was acceptable under the First Amendment. Id. at 2775; see Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
179. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2784 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
182. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S.

697, 699-700 (1986). The Alexander majority compared the closure order in Arcara
to the forfeiture order in Alexander and concluded that both were punishments for
past criminal conduct. CompareAlexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772 with Arcara, 478 U.S. at
699-700.

183. Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 2771. For a further discussion describing the seized assets, see
supra note 16.
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Kennedy emphasized that the lack of adjudication of obscenity for
18 5
the expressive material rendered the forfeiture unconstitutional.
Finally, the dissent believed that the procedural protection established in Marcus v. Search Warrantof 104 East Tenth Street'8 6 and A
Quantity of Books v. Kansas,18 7 should have been applied to Alexander. In both Marcus and A Quantity of Books, the Supreme Court
held that the government's seizure of expressive material prior to
an adjudication of obscenity violated the First Amendment."' The
dissent questioned why the seizure in Alexander, similar in type to
these previous cases, was not given the same protection. In Alexander, there had been no adjudication of obscenity of material seized
postconviction.'8 9 There were only convictions under an obscenity
statute and RICO for material seized prior to the forfeiture. 190 Due
to the failure to establish obscenity before seizure of the material,
the dissent found the forfeiture to be unconstitutional. 19 1
IV.

CmIcAL ANALYsIS

By characterizing forfeiture of expressive material under RICO
as a subsequent punishment for obscenity offenses and not as a
prior restraint, the Alexander majority ignored important First
Amendment issues of protection of speech and expressive activity.
First, the Alexander majority narrowly interpreted previous decisions
185. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 2785-86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Marcus v. Search Warrant
of 104 E. Tenth St., 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961)).
187. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378
U.S. 215, 210-11 (1964)).
188. See A Quantity of Books, 378 U.S. at 210-11 (invalidating state procedure
allowing seizure of allegedly obscene books prior to adversarial hearing); Marcus,
367 U.S. at 731 (invalidating vague and unspecific warrant used to seize allegedly
obscene material). The Alexander dissent argued that the risk of prior restraint was
the important factor behind the "special protection" provided for search and
seizure of First Amendment material. Alexander, 113 S. CL at 2785 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). As such, the dissent argued, the majority should have prevented the
"seizure and destruction of expressive materials in circumstances such as are
presented in [Alexander] without an adjudication of their unlawful character." Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
189. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Court required a determination of obscenity before circulation of nonobscene material
could be interrupted. A Quantity of Books, 378 U.S. at 213.
190. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769-70.
191. Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent concurred in remanding the case for Eighth Amendment consideration. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
However, the dissent argued it was unnecessary to reach the Eighth Amendment
argument because the forfeiture was a prior restraint. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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when evaluating examples of the prior restraint.1 9 2 Second, the Alexander majority dismissed the importance of distinguishing among
forfeitable assets in cases involving expressive material protected by
the First Amendment.
The Alexander majority stated that the distinction between
prior restraint and subsequent punishment was "solidly grounded"
in previous cases.' 9 3 However, the majority defined prior restraint
by adopting Professor Melville Nimmer's definition of prior restraint 94 rather than by utilizing definitions it had used in previous
opinions. 195 By adopting this definition, the Court significantly
narrowed the scope of the prior restraint doctrine. 19 6 The Nimmer
definition included only administrative and judicial orders that prohibited expression before communication to the public.' 9 7 By using this definition, the majority essentially limited the application
of the prior restraint doctrine to temporary restraining orders and
permanent injunctions. 198 The majority did not view the forfeiture
order in Alexander as a prior restraint because Alexander was free to
continue his business in the future without prior governmental approval of his future activities. 199
The Court correctly stated that Alexander was free to re-establish his business in the future. Having chosen to use this definition
of prior restraint, however, the majority should have applied the
definition more accurately. The majority essentially redefined
prior restraint, but failed to apply the new definition to Alexander.
192. Id. at 2771. The majority cited Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445
U.S. 308 (1980), Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971)
and Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Each of these cases
involved the issuance of a permanent injunction. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771.
The majority did not address Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), or
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion regarding the prior restraint issue.
193. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771.

194.

NIMMER,

supra note 65, § 4.03, at 4-14.

195. Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2771.

196. Id.
197. Id. Professor Nimmer defined prior restraint as an "administrative [or]
judicial order[ ] forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the

time that such communications [were] to occur." NIMMER, supra note 65, § 4.03, at
4-14.
198. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2781-82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy discussed Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), and Bantam
Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2781-82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy argued that these cases provided examples
of nontraditional prior restraints. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
stated that "injunctive systems which threaten or bar future speech based on some
past infraction" are prior restraints under these decisions. Id. at 2783 (Kennedy,J,
dissenting).
199. Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2771.
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The RICO forfeiture provisions qualified as a prior restraint
under the majority's definition. Indeed, the forfeited material was
seized pursuant to the district court's order forbidding communication of material "in advance of the time that such communications
[were] to occur. "200 After Alexander's conviction, the government
seized and destroyed all nonobscene, expressive material; thus this
201
material could never be distributed to the public.
Additionally, the Alexander majority believed that "it [was] important... to delineate with some precision the defining characteristics of a prior restraint," but the majority failed to set forth these
characteristics. 20 2 Instead, the majority discussed cases where temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions were used to
prevent publication. 20 3 The majority implied that because the
RICO forfeiture order was not a temporary restraining order or a
permanent injunction, it, therefore, was not a prior restraint. Following this logic, any infringement upon speech would be permissian
ble under the First Amendment as long as it followed 20
4
punishment.
a
as
characterized
was
and
adjudication of obscenity
The Alexander majority did not thoroughly discuss previous
Supreme Court decisions relevant to the issue in Alexander. The
majority overlooked the Court's decision in Bantam Books, which set
forth the Court's obligation to look "through [the] form to the substance" of the order to discover and eliminate "informal censorship." 20 5 In Bantam Books, the Court stated "[a]ny system of prior
restraints of expression... bear[s] a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity."2 0 6 The Alexander majority did not evaluate
200. NIMMER, supra note 65, § 4.03, at 4-14.
201. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Alexander, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993). The government did not want to distribute pornographic material, so the material was destroyed. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770 n.1.
202. Alexander, 113 S. CL at 2773.
203. Id. at 2771-72; see Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 310,
317 (1980) (holding public nuisance statute was unconstitutional prior restraint
where it authorized injunctions preventing exhibition of films not yet adjudicated
obscene, upon showing theater had previously shown obscene films); Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 702, 722-23 (1931) (holding statute to be unconstitutional prior restraint where it authorized injunctions suppressing publications
that had published malicious, scandalous or defamatory information).
204. See Brief for Petitioner at 25, Alexander, 113 S.Ct. 2766 (1993). Petitioner argued that "the mere fact that a sanction [was] imposed as part of a criminal statutory scheme cannot provide the litmus test separating the permissible
from the impermissible sanction." Id. Otherwise, First Amendment protection
could be easily avoided by labeling legislative action as punishment. Id.; see also
Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2783 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
205. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963).
206. Id. at 70.
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this language, nor did it discuss how forfeiture of expressive material may fit into this broad category of "any system" of prior
207
restraint.
The Alexander majority justified its decision that the RICO forfeiture was a constitutionally permissible punishment by comparing
it to the closure order in Arcara.2 08 However, the majority overlooked a significant factual distinction which resulted in an imprecise comparison. In Arcara, the Court focused on the expressive
aspects of the conduct that triggered the closure. The judicial order in Arcara mandated the closure of the business, but did not
require the seizure of expressive material. 20 9 As the Court stated in
Arcara, "the order [ ] imposed no restraint at all on the dissemination of particular materials." 2 10 In Alexander, however, both the
21 1
business and the expressive material were seized.
Although the First Amendment was an important issue in both
Alexanderand Arcara, the application of free speech analysis differed
in each case. While there was no restraint of expressive material in
Arcara, there was such a restraint in Alexander.
The Court has pointed out that constitutional analysis must be
different in situations where speech activity is at issue.212 The Alexander majority, however, neglected to incorporate this theory into
its analysis. In Arcara, the Court found that speech activity was not
involved, but the Alexander majority did not address this critical factual distinction. This distinction essentially supports the characterization of the Arcara order as a subsequent punishment.
Additionally, the factual inconsistencies indicate that the Alexander
order should not be evaluated under the same standard as Arcara.
The evaluation in Alexander should be sensitive to First Amendment
issues.
Moreover, the Alexander majority quickly disposed of an important issue in this case - the nature of the forfeiture. The majority
207. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769-76.
208. Id. at 2772. For a further discussion of Arcara, see supra notes 87-92 and
accompanying text.
209. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 699-700 (1986).
210. Id. at 706 n.2.
211. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770.
212. See id. at 2783 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Roaden v. Kentucky, 413
U.S. 496, 501 (1973) (holding that Fourth Amendment seizure issues concerning
expressive material were not to be evaluated in "vacuum"; First Amendment considerations were not to be ignored); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-51
(1959) (holding that decisions illustrating legal devices and doctrines, although
usually consistent with Constitution, "cannot be applied in settings where they
have the collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expression").
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stated that the order merely authorized the seizure of specific assets
213
that were related to Alexander's previous racketeering offenses.
These forfeited assets, however, included nonobscene, expressive
material protected by the First Amendment. This fact was not fully
addressed by the majority. Instead, the majority combined the expressive material with the other seized property and generically
characterized them as "assets."2 14 The Alexander majority reasoned
that the RICO statute did not consider the implications of seizing
different kinds of assets, and, therefore, the seizure of expressive
material without regard to First Amendment protection was justified. 215 The majority allowed Congress' enactment of the forfeiture
provisions to serve as a guarantee of the constitutionality of those
2 16
provisions.
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion seems to be the better
view of the case for two reasons. First, the dissent applied previous
Supreme Court decisions which required an analysis of the operation and effect of the suspect governmental action. The dissent rejected the formalistic analysis adopted by the majority. Second, the
dissent provided a more thorough analysis than the majority of the
First Amendment concerns prompted by the RICO forfeiture.
V.

IMPACT

Alexander has potentially detrimental implications for distributors of expressive material.2 17 The self-censorship that presently exists due to the vague obscenity standard 218 will be stretched even
further due to the extensive forfeiture penalties that lurk on every
bookshelf or gallery wall. The Alexander Court denies First Amendment protection to nonobscene, expressive material merely because the material is in some way related to an obscenity offense
2 19
under RICO.
Additionally, the ease of establishing a pattern of racketeering
activity will encourage self-censorship. Under RICO, only two pred213. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772.

214. Id. at 2771.
215. Id. at 2772.
216. In Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,the Court pointed out that a state may
not avoid constitutional safeguards established in previous Supreme Court cases by
"recategorizing as a pattern of obscenity violations [ ] 'racketeering.'" 489 U.S. 46,
67 (1989). The Alexander majority failed to address why this is acceptable in the
federal context.
217. See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2776-77 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
218. For a discussion of the Miller obscenity standard, see supra note 1.
219. Eggenberger, supra note 19, at 98.
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icate offenses committed within a ten year period that are sufficiently related and threaten "continued criminal activity" are
needed to trigger a forefeiture of assets. 22 0 Thus the resulting punishment for the sale of two obscene videos can be severe. 22 ' Distributors of expressive material will be more likely to censor certain
222
material than risk losing their entire business.
It appears that any protection given to expressive material will
have to be accomplished by an act of Congress. Because the majority found constitutional support for the RICO forfeiture provisions,
Congress will have to change RICO in order to exempt nonobscene
material from the forfeiture provisions. Thus, while obscene material would remain forfeitable, nonobscene material would be protected. Longer prison terms or larger fines, barring Eighth
Amendment problems, could be substituted for forfeiture in these
situations. However, common sense dictates that very few members
of Congress will be likely to support a change to the statute which,
while protecting First Amendment principles, would have the effect
of supporting the sale of pornographic material.
Additionally, prior restraint status may now be unnecessarily
limited to traditional types of restraints such as temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions. 22 3 It will be difficult to
successfully argue before the Court that any nontraditional prohibition on speech should be categorized as a prior restraint.2 24 As a
result, new methods of government-sponsored censorship might be
tailored to avoid this inflexible definition. These censorial mechanisms will be constitutionally permissible under the Alexander analysis and will threaten First Amendment protection of freedom of
speech.
Julie A. Sollenberger
220. RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). Two predicate offenses establish a
pattern of racketeering activity under RICO, § 1962. However, under the Supreme
Court's decision in HJ.Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., the government must

also show that the predicate offenses satisfy the "continuity plus relationship" test.
492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989). Thus a certain level of relatedness and continuity of the

predicate offenses is required. Id.
221. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text for discussion of the
Eighth Amendment implications of RICO forfeiture.
222. Eggenberger, supra note 19, at 95. The provisions, as an "overbroad attack on obscenity," suppress protected material directly and indirectly through selfcensorship of sexually explicit, but not obscene, material. Id. Eggenberger stated:
"Any self-censorship of borderline books, magazines or movies would threaten
public access to materials containing controversial matter or expressing divergent
viewpoints." Id.
223. See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771.
224. See id. at 2781 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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